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Abstract 
This article examines the ways in which ideas of state are constituted in North Ethiopia 
by focusing on corruption and development discourses found in local public domains as 
well as on religious metaphors and idioms which define the roles and obligations 
involved in governance. Specifically, I highlight the ways in which people draw on 
experiences of everyday life to formulate the normative basis of state authority and how 
this contributes to the production of an understanding that the state appears to be both 
above and separate from local politics and society. The study generates new insights into 
how local values, expressed through metaphors and idioms, serve to orient asymmetrical 
power relations between state and local people into a relationship (and mutual recognition) 
of responsibility and obligation. I argue that state formation can be fruitfully explored 
from a vantage point that explores specific configurations of divergent discursive 
practices, a process shaped by the ongoing contingencies of social relations, as well as 
the actions, expectations and hopes of the people involved in the process. 




Recent scholarship on African statehood has provided invaluable description of the ways in 
which state power is produced through everyday practices of negotiation and contestation 
between different actors (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014; Hagmann and Péclard 2010; 
Lund 2006). Most of these studies focus on modes of governance and power relations within a 
variety of local institutions, paying close attention to themes such as public education provision 
(Korling 2010), public health care provision (Jaffre and Olivier de Sardan 2003) and corruption 
(Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006; Smith 2007; Routley 2016). Importantly this literature on 
the state in Africa has also shown that the modalities by which the state in Africa emerges as a 
centre of society are manifested in more than institutional and administrative practices. It is 
also discursively constructed and imagined (Gallagher 2017; Friedman 2011) through cultural 
representations. Ethnographers have revealed how discursive and cultural principles, and 
organising practices such as witchcraft (Geschiere 1997; West 2005; Ashforth 2005), localised 
notions of tradition and rhetoric of law (Bertelsen 2016; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006), and 
the making and unmaking of border and borderlands (Dorman, Hammett, and Nugent 2007) 
inform operations of state power in everyday cultural and social life. In such conceptions, the 
state is heterogonous and socially embedded, not a singular and unitary centre of power.  
This article aims to contribute to this emerging literature by examining the active and 
ongoing processes by which the Ethiopian state comes to be produced in a rural kebele1 I shall 
call Degga in the Amhara regional state of Ethiopia. It analyses the manner in which how ideas 
of what the state is and how it is meant to function is constituted in people’s imaginations in 
the context of everyday social life. In so doing, I seek to capture the idea of the Ethiopian state 
in the imagination of the people who inhabit it. By imagination I mean, the multiple ways 
through which ordinary people ‘perceive, and talk about, represent and construct, and 
experience’ (Friedman 2011: 8) the state. Political imagination, although susceptible to 
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illusions, exaggeration, falsehood and fantasies (Friedman 2011), arises as an effect of local 
discursive practices2 (Tsing 1993: 25) and is therefore crucial for the representation of the state 
as a coherent entity. I seek to show in this article that political imagination in Ethiopia 
particularly has taken root in development discourses 3  and in their imbrication within a 
culturally specific normative ideals about the state. I suggest that the specifically local ways in 
which discourses about development in Ethiopia is articulated elicit the diversity of lived 
practices, experience and social interactions, which simultaneously relate to contextualised 
knowledge, moral idioms and cultural values that carry the social and political life of people in 
contemporary North Ethiopia. The article draws attention to the divergence and multiplicity of 
discursive practices articulated around the idea of development that offer windows onto 
contingent understandings of the state in Ethiopia.  
The specific local discursive practices under the purview of this article are those related to 
corruption and religious idioms and metaphors (and their entanglement with the ideology of 
development). First the article examines corruption discourses found in kebele public domains 
as a means of understanding the way in which the state comes to be constructed and imagined. 
By the kebele public domain, I mean the habitual social spaces such as tea and coffee houses, 
tella bet (literally meaning beer house) and the informal roadside gatherings where local 
inhabitants engage with a variety of issues that shape the idea of state and moral rights and 
wrongs. In such spaces, the local population (usually male members of the community)4 as 
social actors, disparage and gossip about state functionaries, tell each other stories of corruption 
and the success and failure of local development projects and also exchange information about 
the distribution of agricultural inputs, weddings, funerals and other local social events. The 
kebele domain should not, however, be contrasted to a fixed national or global domain. Instead, 
it is a site where multiple issues of local concern and problems affecting everyday life such as 
provision of basic needs including agricultural resources, water, and proper management of 
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land are discussed both on their own terms and in relation to national politics, current affairs 
and events. Although the local–national distinction is fluid, and as the ethnography below 
depicts, the national nevertheless was often viewed as an external and official realm or a state 
sphere which stands over and above the kebele domain. The national domain as such was linked 
to the state’s commitment to development, and popular discussions were mostly positive 
because of that.  
In participating in kebele public domains5, I found corruption to be a favourite topic of 
everyday conversation. Men would meet in one of the local public domains – usually during 
the evening, when the day’s work was done, and during religious off-work days – to tell stories 
of corruption. They share ideas, experiences and obtained new information about, for instance, 
how much civil servants would likely demand and so on. Within such talk and discourses, the 
actions of local leaders were argued over and eventually evaluated against local moral norms. 
Politicians were often described as corrupt, self-serving and unscrupulous. Significantly, they 
talked about the embezzlement of development resources, about the amount of money the 
kebele officials had so far diverted from development programmes or were expected to divert, 
and about the cost of getting things done (guday masfetsemya). In such discussions, the word 
musena (the Amharic equivalent of the English term corruption) was explicitly mentioned only 
in few instances. An often-used phrase was ‘eating up’ (meblat) of state resources. Another 
term that was often employed to describe the perceived widespread nature of corruption was 
‘stealing’ (meserek). These terms were frequently used in situations where people perceive 
there to be theft and misuse of development resources. This article focuses on examining how 
such corruption idioms and discourses help people make sense of politics, imagine the state 
and how they confer on them specific claims of important agricultural resources6 that are 
perceived to be controlled and managed by powerful state functionaries.  
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One key focus of this article then concerns how different narratives of corruption held by 
local people, and of development held by government representatives inform state imagination 
and compete with each other. These narratives attempt to either represent the state in order to 
contest the monopoly and misuse of development resources by state functionaries, or – as in 
the case of the government representatives – to challenge such narratives. However, they all 
give meaning and resonance to different ideas of the state in the contemporary context.  
Second, I seek to show that state imagination in Ethiopia, as elsewhere, is not solely a 
product of contemporary popular notions about issues such as corruption and development. It 
is also intimately tied to the cultural world view of the local people. In the view of this study, 
the latter cannot be divorced from particular contemporary discourses surrounding the state. In 
my attempt to demonstrate the modalities by which the state comes to be imagined, I therefore 
pay attention to the religious language and metaphors that make for a particular political 
culture. By political culture, I mean the system of signs and meaning through which people 
make sense of politics (Haugerud 1995). My contention is that the political-cultural is not a 
self-evident repertoire of political common sense or a source of legitimacy for political 
authority but rather a contingent process that is ceaselessly constructed and reconstructed 
through processes of contest and acquiescence between different social actors (Hodgson 2017; 
Haugerud 1995). One site through which power and political culture in North Ethiopia operate 
and are instituted is the church. Hence, in this article, I demonstrate how religious language 
and metaphors enable people to imagine the state. I do not, however, address religious 
discourses directly but instead make reference to the metaphors, expressed through narratives, 
which denote the cultural understanding and world views relevant to state imagination and the 
elements of particular principles that underlay relationships. 
Together, the two set of discursive practices provide complex, diverse and contingent 
understandings of the state articulated by rural residents. My purpose is to demonstrate how 
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local people combine divergent aspects of different types of discourses circulating at a local 
level to construct a particular image of the Ethiopian state.  
The discussions in this article draws specifically upon my doctoral fieldwork for three 
months, between 2014 and 2015, in West Gojjam zone of Amhara regional state. My method 
of research included a range of different techniques such as in-depth interviews/conversations, 
direct and participant observations. Almost all of the informants were asked to reflect on issues 
that were pertinent mostly to the state. More specifically, in order to bring agency into my 
research and explore different meaning-making, I framed questions largely in the form of a 
life-history narrative and biographical approach. In the informal roadside or neighbourhood 
gatherings, where conversation topics involved corruption and/or development failure, I 
assumed the role of observer-as-participant. To avoid being perceived as taking sides in such 
highly contentious local issues, my participation was limited to seeking clarification or to 
obtaining some idea of the meanings that the participants attributed to their narratives. In total, 
I met, conversed with and interviewed more than 70 informants including farmers, government 
agents and representatives of water user association. 
The research was particularly based on my embedded experiences of the everyday in local 
spaces. As an Ethiopian, and also as someone who shares a common language and cultural 
background with my informants, I was viewed as an ‘insider’ by the local community. This 
meant that I was able to establish a good rapport with a broad range of people and, as a result, 
I was able to secure access to local events, meetings and informal discussions. However, it also 
brought a challenge to my role as a researcher, meaning that I had to make a conscious effort 
to manage my insider status through reflexive techniques such as constant disconfirming, 
deliberately enquiring about details that I would otherwise have taken for granted, blocking 
and deconstructing my own assumptions and seeking alternative interpretations of narratives, 
as well as to ensure critical distance was maintained throughout the process. 
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In the discussion below, I review the different conceptions and understandings of the 
concept of the state in Ethiopia. Next, I lay out discourses of corruption in a series of 
ethnographic vignettes to demonstrate the different meaning and function it has not only to the 
production of state idea but also in the lives of the rural poor. I then explore the responses of 
local officials to allegations of corruption and how perceive the state development programmes 
they are part of, and thereby how they imagine the state. In the last section, I highlight how 
people in Degga imagine the state through their use of language replete with religious 
metaphors and symbolism. In conclusion I reflect on the implications of normative discourses 
for contemporary understanding of state-society relations in Ethiopia.  
Conceptualising mengist  
During the first weeks of my fieldwork in Degga, but also afterwards, I went around asking 
people the question ‘what is mengist’ (roughly meaning state or government)? Many of 
informants could not give a clear answer; many others would mull over my question before 
saying, ‘I never thought about it before’. At first, I was slightly unnerved by the lack of concrete 
answers. Yet, as I began to spend more time with my informants and following them through 
their daily activities, I found that all too often the state was constantly referred to in 
conversations as if it were a living reality, unified and tangible enough to enable anybody to 
discern its form and meaning. The meaning of the state in popular usage of the term, however, 
was anything but static. Indeed, the use of the term mengist is fraught with difficulty.  
While the essence of the concept is intact, there are several idiosyncratic applications. The 
word, used in everyday conversations is a derivative of the term neges, which means the act of 
becoming a king (Toggia 2008). It signifies extensive notions of power, royal privilege and 
authority. It does not make a distinction between government and state (Vaughan and Tronvoll 
2003). Often academic discussions about the state in Ethiopia start with the same conception 
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of a unified state. Ethiopist scholarship, for example, has for so long been expressly concerned 
with a historical metanarrative of what Christopher Clapham (2002) aptly termed ‘the great 
tradition’ – a belief in the continuity of an ancient and unitary state tradition (Ullendorff 1973; 
Tadesse 1972; Sergew 1972). Writers working within this tradition invariably use the notion 
of state to refer to all ‘kingdoms and empires in ancient and medieval periods, as well as the 
modern Ethiopian states’ (Toggia 2008: 331). In other words, the modern concept of the state 
is simply projected onto the historical past, and, as such, the Ethiopian state is represented more 
as an already well-formed and well-organised trans-historical entity that evolves linearly and 
steers the course of social life than as a social formation produced at a specific and recent 
historical juncture and as one which is in a constant process of construction through social 
struggles and cultural idioms.  
For modernist political writers and historians, the key question is whether the Ethiopian 
state fits in the international system of states, especially in light of what is generally called the 
modernisation project: practices related to the creation of bureaucratic machinery, the adoption 
of modern European law, and commercialisation of the economy (Clapham 1988; Bahru 1991; 
Keller1991; Teshale 1995). Here, the notion of the state is explicitly tied up with classic 
Weberian conception of the state as a single and monolithic territorial semi-bureaucratic 
machine with a monopoly of power. Scholars of spatial thinking, on the other hand, generally 
adopt a simple binary of centre and periphery approach to Ethiopian statehood (Donham 1986; 
Markakis 2011). These studies define the Ethiopian centre as the foci of state power which are 
constituted through the cultural idioms of the Amharic- and Tigrinya -speaking groups of 
highland Ethiopia. The periphery, on the other hand, is seen to be non-Abyssinian groups who 
were identified in terms of their physical proximity to the capital, Addis Ababa, as a nodal 
point of communication, their level of incorporation to the state structure and their degree of 
self-identification with the ‘Greater Ethiopia’ myth (see Clapham 2002). 
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However, turning the lens on to state-society relations and the normative foundations of 
state power, several anthropological and sociological studies explored the internal dynamics 
and workings of the Ethiopian state (see, e.g., Levine 1965; Hoben 1970; Vaughan and 
Tronvoll 2003; Abbink 1997; Lefort 2007). These studies provide rich accounts of the complex 
overlap and interface between traditional values and formal institutions, and   complex of 
beliefs, symbols and values regarding authority and hierarchical relations that frame political 
life in North Ethiopia. From these studies emerges a more complex a conceptual picture 
mengist as culturally embedded. However, the supposition of a reified understanding of the 
concept of mengist as a self-contained actor persists in writings on the state in Ethiopia (Teferi 
2004). Lefort’s (2007) work has been particularly influential in this respect. In a rich analysis 
of peasant-state relations in rural Ethiopia, Lefort depicts a picture of a hierarchical society in 
which mengist is viewed as an all-powerful Leviathan. Here, at the same time as I recognise 
the importance of the hierarchical conception of authority in North Ethiopia, I argue that our 
theoretical frameworks for studying the state in Ethiopia need to take more account of the 
relational principles which are embedded in the cultural conception of hierarchy. Significantly, 
a more nuanced analysis of these processes is crucial to understanding the way through which 
the state comes to be understood. 
 In my view, the vernacular Amharic word mengist doesn’t tells us much about the Ethiopian 
state itself – in terms of what it actually means to the people. To take such a conception as the 
starting point of analysis of the Ethiopian state, therefore, as Fuller and Harris argue, risks 
turning the state into a master concept which ‘purportedly explains more than it possibly can’ 
(2001: 10). Indeed, the fact of everyday references to certain activities as mengist make its use 
a ‘social fact.’ Nevertheless, in the view of this study, the concept of mengist cannot singularly 
capture and explain what all Ethiopians – who are positioned differently – actually think, 
imagine and do. Rather, this article argues that the concept of state has to be explained by 
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exploring the ways in which it is invoked in everyday conversations and by investigating what 
it variously means and does for the people. From this vantage point, in what follows I draw 
attention to local narratives about corruption to show multiple ways in which the state is 
differently constructed by differently positioned actors. 
Ideals of a Sublime State: Corruption and livelihood talk 
Many of the people with whom I spoke in Degga drew attention to the difficulties of securing 
a livelihood in times when corruption is perceived to be a pervasive and widespread practice. 
Most people complained about local officials diverting development resources such as 
chemical fertilisers and improved varieties of seeds and about the unfair access of the rich to 
irrigation water, credit services and state procurement prices for wheat.  However, many 
absolved mengist of blame and instead blamed local politicians for abusing and diverting 
development resources from the poor for private use. 
One day, for instance, during a fairly ordinary conversation with a group of kebele residents 
at a local coffee house, the topic abruptly turned to agricultural resources distribution. As usual, 
there was speculation as to whether the government would provide adequate fertiliser in time 
for the spring growing period. ‘The government is not at fault. It is the people [cooperatives] 
who distribute inputs who are to blame. They divert fertilisers to merchants and deliberately 
hold back distribution from us. I know this because there are always fertilisers on the black 
market,’ said one middle-aged farmer, distinguishing between the distant state and its local 
representatives. Everybody agreed. The general feeling among my interlocutors was that it was 
locally powerful individuals who were to blame for them being left bereft of state-sanctioned 
agricultural resources. When I asked them to describe the processes by which agricultural 
resources were distributed in the kebele, another middle-aged man replied, ‘Agricultural inputs 
are never distributed equitably in our kebele. We are normally supposed to share them equally 
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according to our needs. But the poor never get adequate amounts of what the government sends 
us ... the kebele officials and cooperative managers eat up the development resources.’ 
Similarly, the third interlocutor commented, ‘there is no equal sharing of resources … woreda7 
and kebele officials eat up all the resources’. When I enquired as to why he thought the local 
officials ‘eat up’ agricultural resources, he replied sounding surprised, possibly by the naiveté 
of my question, ‘If you come back early in January, you can see a pile of fertiliser bags stacked 
at the front veranda of the chairman’s house’. In support of his friend and as evidence of 
rampant local-level state corruption, the first speaker gave the following anecdote from his own 
experience: ‘last summer I stood in line for three days to get one bag of fertiliser from the 
cooperative … when I received it, it looked to me as if the bag had been opened and repackaged. 
I then went straight to the mill house to find a scale … I discovered that it was 3 kg 
underweight.’ ‘So why are you not bothered about going to the woreda administrator and 
complaining?’ I asked. He replied that it would be of no use. ‘I know it is our right. The 
government gave us the right … they are bound by the government to respect our right. But 
there is no point in complaining to the woreda administration. They are all in this together – 
even the woreda administrator is part of this. He would not do anything.’ These comments 
highlight the widespread belief that state functionaries indulge in corruption and, hence, they 
subvert the purported impartiality and benevolence of the state.  
I followed my interlocutors’ lead and began asking other people how they felt about the 
distribution of agricultural resources. Time and again I heard similar stories and complaints 
about the corruption of government officials. On another occasion, for instance, I was sitting 
chatting with four local farmers when one, whom I shall call Kebede, recounted the hardships 
he faced after half of his crop was destroyed by insects and pests. He said he struggled to 
support his family by working as a daily-wage labourer. He also noted that one of his four 
children dropped out of school to work for wealthy farmers by tending their cattle and 
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supporting his parents. In the meantime, Kebede said a deputy of the local primary cooperative 
offered to help him obtain pesticides for the coming harvesting season, which he accepted. 
However, as he was about to receive the pesticides from the cooperative, the deputy began 
hounding him. ‘He wanted to keep some bottles of the pesticides for himself,’ explained 
Kebede. But instead of conceding, Kebede confronted the cooperative deputy, which angered 
him more and led to him threatening to take away all the pesticides. He reprimanded Kebede 
for being unwilling to reciprocate in the expected manner – that is, by showing due respect and 
ceding half of the pesticides. Kebede explained, ‘I thought he was sincere and wanted to help 
me. But, I was naive … that was not his motive … he wanted me to feel grateful and concede 
half of the pesticides as a dollop of gratitude to his favour. He had not given me anything from 
his own pocket. This was mine in the first place … this came from the government.’ Kebede 
felt that he should not give any material gift or pay a debt of gratitude through sentimental 
expression, that is, through submission or cowering, because he considered the pesticides to be 
from mengist and originally intended to reach him. In the end, however, Kebede conceded to 
the deputy’s demand because, he said, his family relied heavily on access to such inputs for 
their survival.  
The three other men present endorsed Kebede’s view in saying that the government ‘sends 
resources to the kebele population’8 and that it is ‘our right to get access to pesticides’.9 Clearly, 
my interlocutors viewed themselves as agents who were rightfully able to lay claim to the 
development resources provided by the state. But they also expressed that mere awareness did 
not amount to much; hence, they criticised Kebede for failing to strategically negotiate with 
the cooperative head at an early stage. One of them commented, ‘they do not act out of altruism; 
they are interested only in their own benefits … you should have known that he wanted to help 
you to steal more resources for himself … you could have negotiated to concede only a quarter 
of the bottles’. From their experiences, my interlocutors were aware that access to development 
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resources and a successful livelihood were arrived at not by laying claim to resources but by 
mastering the technique of negotiating with corrupt officials. Clearly, their social position and 
poverty prevented them from fully asserting claims to resources they considered to be passed 
down to them by a benevolent state.  
On another day, my acquaintance, whom I shall call Ayele, in emphasising the importance 
of negotiating with locally powerful people, provided me with evidence of his successful 
negotiation with a cooperative manager. In 2006, he was invited to join a new micro-credit 
cooperative that was in the process of being established. Ayele, however, rejected multiple 
invitations because he considered the cooperative to offer no benefit. Once the lending 
programme began, however, he saw members of the cooperative benefitting from it and wanted 
to join. At that point, however, the cooperative had many members and Ayele’s application 
was rejected on the grounds that he was ‘poor and incapable of paying back loans’. Ayele 
confided to me that he was aware that joining the cooperative at any time was his state-
conferred right as a poor farmer. However, he opted to seek the assistance of a local elder, 
arguing that laying claim to his state-given right ‘would only be seen as confrontational’ and 
that ‘it would antagonise’ the head of the cooperative. The mediation was successful and Ayele, 
after months of waiting, was admitted to the cooperative.  
Within seven months of his admission, he received loans from the cooperative and was 
involved in the breeding of cattle. Since that time, he has successfully increased the number of 
his cattle from one to three. Yet Ayele refused to view his success as an outcome of the 
benevolence of the local elder and the head of the cooperative. ‘Mengist is like a father to us 
the poor people. We have its support in all things … but the greedy people always create 
obstacles. They want to eat up everything alone,’ he concluded. 
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Here, we can see that Ayele positioned himself as a knowledgeable and right-bearing 
individual. His passive supplication to the locally powerful actors only highlights his strategy 
for securing a livelihood. This reality contrasts sharply with the views of officials, who 
caricature the poor as ignorant and lazy farmers. My informant, on the other hand, formed an 
image of a right-giver and resource provider idea of state. Clearly, Ayele’s attempt to 
differentiate between a benevolent state idea and corrupt local officials and his use of this 
distinction to construct himself as right-bearing individual echoes the similar accounts 
provided by his friends and many of my other informants. 
From the discussion above, a complex picture emerges in which state is perceived and 
imagined in a dual way. In other words, the discourse of corruption has helped to create a clear 
division between an idea of a distant and transcendental state which is imagined as a moral 
repertoire of social justice and a neutral dispenser of the development resources vital to the 
livelihood needs and survival of the poor and those local institutions that are dominated by 
corrupt individuals. In abstract terms, following Hansen (2001: 226), state imagination in 
Degga can be understood as consisting of ‘sublime’ (abstract) and ‘profane’ dimensions. The 
sublime dimension refers to the qualities of providence, benevolence and impartiality that 
people see as imbuing the trans-local state. Here, the state figures as a site of power far removed 
from kebele life and suspended above local partial and vested class interests. Such a conception 
of the state has a great deal to do with anti-corruption rhetoric and discourses of development 
that are periodically mobilised by the state for political purposes and the legitimisation of 
development projects. The ‘profane’ dimension, on the other hand, encompasses the 
bureaucracy and local politicians with whom the people interact on a daily basis. The everyday 
administration, as we have seen, is perceived to be imbued with corruption, partiality and 
abuses of power. In short, the ‘sublime’ dimension is constructed and imagined as the antithesis 
of the ‘profane’ aspect of everyday administrative problems and venality of the bureaucracy. 
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The discrepancy between the discourses of development and the realities of corruption bolster 
the legitimacy of the state and the party. They therefore help to construct what O’Brien and Li 
(2006) call ‘boundary-spanning claims’ – claims that do not challenge the state system but 
rather stress loyalty and submission to the state and the party.  
The ideal of a developmental state: Responses of local officials  
In contrast to the local inhabitants’ narratives about corruption stand the state functionaries, 
who rely on strategic discourses of development to defend their positions. In response to my 
enquiries as to why there were numerous complaints about the ways in which agricultural and 
irrigation water resources were distributed, community leaders, kebele and woreda officials 
and development practitioners all alike had ready answers. In every instance, they referred to 
the concepts of productivity, developmentalism, modernity and progress, useful for the state’s 
promotion of national development and the creation of an antagonistic political field, in 
justifying the monopoly of agricultural inputs, land and water resources.  
When I asked the woreda administrator to respond to the widespread perception among the 
local population that agricultural resources were misappropriated, he said, ‘I interact with the 
farmers quite a lot, many of them are diligent … but there are also lazy, anti-development 
farmers who spread such false rumours and allegations of corruption. We hear people gossiping 
that we have fertilisers and pesticides piled up in warehouses.’ He continued, ‘it is impossible 
to convince most people that we distribute resources equitably because they don’t understand 
the mechanisms involved in the import and distribution of agricultural resources’.10 These 
types of attitudes of the state functionaries about themselves and the farmers were pervasive. 
The woreda Agriculture Bureau head, for instance, explained how the entire woreda 
administration could not afford to ignore the issue of agricultural resource distribution because 
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it was central to achieving the government’s rural development and agricultural productivity 
agenda:  
We provide agricultural resources, credit services and irrigation facilities with the aim of 
increasing agricultural productivity. It is crucial for the government that farmers become 
successful. It is also in the interests of woreda and kebele leaders to demonstrate that 
government investments increase smallholders’ productivity.11  
He went on to attribute allegations of corruption to false rumours concocted by ‘work-shy and 
anti-developmental farmers’: 
There are farmers who are work-shy and anti-developmental. They spread false rumours 
of corruption to confuse people and create tension between the people and the 
government. What they ask is only this or that resources … when we ask them to 
meetings and field demonstrations, they grumble and fail to show up.12  
Similarly, when I asked a notable model farmer whether some poor people are systematically 
made to enter into sharecropping arrangements with wealthy farmers, he responded by saying 
that ‘there is no such manipulation’. He then added, ‘it is better for lazy farmers to enter into 
sharecropping than lay their land in fallow or plant [unprofitable] vegetables’.13 This comment 
reveals the discourses used by the wealthy farmers to explain local relations of exploitation.  
The Degga Water Users Association (WUA)14 head, on the other hand, drew on national 
discourses of modernity that validate ‘hard work’ and ‘technology adaptation’, which he 
believed allows some farmers to become more successful and wealthy than others. In so doing, 
he took aim at the poor: 
Most people speaking badly about the successful individuals [the rich] are lazy and 
recalcitrant farmers. They blame teramaj [the progressive] model farmers for their own 
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problems. They are not trying to do their own things. When we ask them to use modern 
technologies and seeds, they refuse. Yet, by the end of the day, while the progressive 
becomes successful, they complain about land, water shortage, the kebele.15  
In the above quote, the WUA head positions the rich as productive, innovative and 
knowledgeable and the poor as unproductive and dependants. In taking stock of the 
circumstances of the poor, the officials and wealthy farmers I spoke with rarely considered the 
asymmetrical nature of local power distribution and other explanations for the marginalisation 
of the poor. Instead, they ascribed the problem of the poor to their particular ignorance and 
illiteracy. The woreda administrator, for instance, said: 
People in Degga need to be taught about and exposed more to their rights. They have a 
long way to go in order to secure their rights. We acknowledge that more capacity 
building work is needed to mitigate people’s lack of knowledge.16  
The kebele chairman remarked in similar terms: ‘We have not overcome the problem of the 
dependency mentality. These are the people who still look for the government to do everything 
for them.’ Here, the chairman, in stark contrast to the popular imagination of the state as a 
provider and caregiver, saw the responsibility of the state in terms of ‘facilitating the 
development of the kebele and the people’. He claims the government was working towards 
‘enabling every household to be self-sufficient, developmental and productive’; hence, ‘we 
need determined and hardworking farmers who fight poverty with vigour’.17 
Taken together, this ‘elitist’ view of the local people’s problems might be best captured by 
a local development agent’s comment:  
Let me tell you. Our people are very backwards. Mind you, they well know that the 
project belongs to them and their children and yet they steal metal from distribution 
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canals: we caught local women washing clothes in the canal water … they lack 
commitment; they don’t come to meetings unless mobilised: if they come, they arrive 
late. They are unwilling to work in conservation works. They want everything provided 
for them. … I am not saying they are not being unfairly treated by community and kebele 
leaders. They are. But, they have to fulfil their duties and change their mindset before 
they ask for their rights to be respected.18  
Overall, these comments from different officials reveal an underlying belief that the state is a 
catalyst for development, not a feeder. The last quote speaks to this and the construction of the 
state as a facilitator of development is at odds with the notion of a benevolent state that is 
constructed by the people. Whereas most people I interacted with used corruption discourses 
to lay claim to development resources as a right conferred by a benevolent state, state officials 
referred to the difference in mindset, knowledge and attitude between themselves and the 
people and used this to explain corruption as a product of false rumour, illiteracy and 
dependency syndrome, thereby positioning themselves as knowledgeable individuals and 
representatives of the state.  
The comments of my interlocutors further highlight how the poor are discursively produced 
in everyday life such that their poverty, lack of development mentality and understanding and 
sophistication defines their life chances and their entire range of possibilities. The discussion 
also demonstrates how the identification of a segment of the local population as anti-
developmental by local leaders neatly converges with the wider EPRDF’s antagonistic political 
discourse of developmental forces against anti-development elements. It is important to note, 
however, that this concurrence does not reflect the entrenchment of party hegemony at the 
kebele level; rather, it shows how local officials forcefully employ Manichean discourses 
(developmental vs anti-developmental) to justify the monopolisation of resources, negate 
corruption complaints and consolidate local class domination. 
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Mirroring the divine: religious symbolism and metaphors  
In addition to corruption discourses, my ethnography in Degga revealed that religious 
metaphors and symbolism are central to the meaning and construction of state idea. In my 
conversations with a broad cross-section of individuals in Degga wherein state was referred to, 
my informants invariably used religious metaphors and idioms that evoked a pathos of divinely 
oriented relations of power and obligation. The local people live under the sway of Orthodox 
Christianity which provides them with the conceptual tropes, idioms and metaphors through 
which they imagine the state. For example, when I asked a middle-aged acquaintance about the 
role of the state in the management of development resources, he explained that the government 
was responsible only for obtaining and sending agricultural inputs to the people. He used the 
following analogy to illustrate his point: ‘God sends rain on all the people to enable us to 
provide food to our families. He does not make it fall only on the fields of some people. Instead, 
He makes it fall equally on all our fields. The good farmer would make use of the rain and feed 
his family. But, who do the family of a lazy farmer have to blame for their lack of access to 
food? Is it God who sends the rain or their head of household that failed to make optimal use 
of the rain?’ 19  In this analogy, my informant distinguished between mengist and the 
bureaucracy and considered mengist’s responsibility – like that of God – to be the provision of 
the resources needed for a livelihood, with the bureaucracy’s responsibility – like that of the 
household head – to make efficient use of those resources, i.e. distributing them to the people. 
In my informant’s account, agricultural resources are always provided by the state but they 
remain inaccessible to the poor because of the corruption of local politicians. Here, the state is 
idealised as a paternalist provider and benefactor and the lower-level state functionaries are 
pathologised. The local people then establish their claim of entitlement to agricultural resources 
by invoking the notion of a benevolent, impartial and disinterested state that always fulfils its 
responsibility of providence to the people.  
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In the analogy, the state, like God, as noted above, is represented as a provider and 
benefactor, but it is important to point out that this does not mean my informant held the view 
that the state and God are the same or should be afforded the same weight. Rather, my 
informant was obviously drawing, to use Levi-Strauss’s (1966) concept, ‘homologous 
opposition’ between the state and the people on one side and God and the people on the other. 
That is, the relationship between the state and society metaphorically resembles the relationship 
between God and the people. In other words, the metaphor should be interpreted as a way of 
establishing ideal relationships within the temporal world (between state and society) by way 
of analogy with perceived relationships in the spiritual world (between God and the Christian 
population).  
The fact that the above metaphorical analogy is not an idiosyncratic view of my 
interlocutor’s view is evident from the comments made to me by other local inhabitants. A 
middle-aged farmer, in the context of discussing the state’s providence in relation to 
agricultural resources, said: ‘God is the one who can give us rain. This is the same with the 
government.’20 In my informant’s comment, the quality of being a state involves providence 
to the people. This means the invocation of religious analogy functions to constitute the 
relationship between state and society which is embedded in the local moral imaginary that 
entails specific rights and responsibilities on both sides.  
Compare this metaphor with the regular account of Amhara farmers conceiving of state 
power as absolute. For example, Lefort (2007: 258) quotes Shoa peasants as saying, ‘God and 
the mengist are the same’. In Lefort’s account, the mandate of the Derg and EPRDF is 
‘perceived as coming from heaven’, and therefore, ‘to submit to the absolutism of the mengist 
is simply to respect divine will’. When Degga farmers, in contrast, use religious symbolism 
and metaphors, they do not describe relations of hierarchy but also refer to their expectations 
of how the state should act. Instead of submitting themselves to the ‘absolutism of state power’, 
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they imagine a God–state–people relationship as a model of stateness and method for good 
governance.  
The majority of my informants drew a homologous analogy between the state and society 
and expressed an understanding that the state, like God, is expected to show benevolence and 
providence towards the people and should generally act as a proxy God. In doing so, they 
clearly distinguish between good mengist and bad mengist. A good mengist would ‘like God 
… look after the well-being of the poor’ and ‘as God … support and protect the poor’.21 Most 
commonly, the Derg regime constituted the central point of reference of bad and illegitimate 
mengist. One senior man, for instance, remarked:  
… the Derg redistributed land at first but later it confiscated more than half of it [and 
also] it took away our oxen to use for producers’ cooperative. [In doing so] it prevented 
us from working our land and forced us to join the producers’ cooperatives. The Derg 
did not work for the poor people; it had no helping nature … a government should [rather] 
be like God in protecting and providing to the people and to the poor who have no allies 
… [but]the Derg acted like a father who doesn’t look after his children but punishes 
them.22  
Others questioned the legitimacy of the authority of the Derg as not emanating from God 
because it did not act as a proper mengist. My acquaintance Ayele, for instance, said: 
The Derg was not from God. It never looked after the people. Instead, it took away our 
oxen and made us work from sunrise to sunset in the producers’ cooperative. In return, 
they would give us 1 quintal of teff, 5 quintals of corn and 2 quintals of sorghum. It never 
sent us development … it conscripted children into the army.23  
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Unlike Ayele, an elderly man saw the Derg as ‘the worst mengist’. He said, ‘It was against us. 
It never took responsibility for the needs of the people’, because ‘it was imposed upon us by 
God as a result of our sin’.24 It is clear that while my two informants provided two different 
explanations as to what gave rise to the Derg government, they nevertheless held a strong 
patrimonial view of the state and expected it to be acting much as God would treat the people, 
as a father to His children. Both characterised the Derg by its lacks of paternal care which was 
revealed by its cruel policies of collective farms, lack of development and military conscription.  
In addition, some of the local inhabitants described former president Mengistu Hailemariam 
as mengist and criticised him for failing to demonstrate care to the local people. One man 
explained: ‘Mengistu Hailemariam was a bad mengist. He had no religion; no moral character; 
he did not bring us development … but misery; he has besmirched the holy country.’25 Another 
said, ‘we don’t regard Mengistu as worthy of being mengist’.26 The conception that Mengistu 
was ‘cruel’ and ‘uncaring’ was often expressed, and, to some of my informants, his lack of 
benevolence was seen as the main cause of his downfall. The common sentiment among my 
informants was that Mengistu lacked the legitimacy to rule because he did not embrace the 
locally cherished Christian values of offering help, protection and support to the downtrodden 
in a way similar to God. Mengistu rather demanded a commitment to his programmes without 
showing munificence to the poor. In this sense, the attribute of stateness, for my informants, 
entailed the moral duty to fulfil the needs and ensure the safety of the people. 
Conversely, when I asked my interlocutors to elaborate on the current government, most of 
them praised it for having brought development and peace. One said, ‘the old mengist was not 
the people’s mengist ... the present mengist is a good mengist. It sends us development. We 
have the chance to send our children to school. We have a health post on our doorstep [kebele]. 
It allowed us to work on our land. There is no military conscription; there is no producers’ 
cooperative. We can sell our grains … it is peaceful.’27 Similarly, another man said, ‘This 
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government is working for the poor …. it worries about everything. In the past women died 
while giving birth. Now, they are taken to hospital in ambulances. It worries about the school 
of our children; even about our habits of toilet use, stove use. It looks after us well and we see 
that it is sent to us from God’28  
While my informants conceived of the state as fulfilling its obligations of care and sending 
development to the local population, they also alleged, as described in previous sections, that 
they were not benefitting from state resources because of the corruption of the local state 
functionaries. The following comment by a middle-aged man is fairly representative of this 
sentiment, ‘Mengist is taking responsibility so that our kebele develops and every one of us 
can have everything we want. But, when resources are sent from mengist, they are eaten up by 
the woreda and kebele officials along the way before they reach us. [As a result,] we continue 
to live in poverty.’29  
To sum up, the preceding discussion provides a valuable corrective to the problematic nature 
of the assumptions scholars make about the farmers’ relationship with the state and their 
attitude towards authority and hierarchy. To be sure, my informants’ accounts underscore the 
hierarchical logic of everyday state formation that permeates Amhara society, whereby the 
divine authority is imagined to encompass the temporal one and then the temporal (state) in 
turn comprises the various layers of state authority (bureaucracy) and society. But the use of 
religious metaphor also indicates the view that power and hierarchy are oriented and 
encompassed by fundamental religious values such as providence, protection, reciprocity and 
benevolence. In this sense, when the farmers relate governance practices and hierarchies to the 
realm of the divine, they not only construct relations of authority but also implicitly invoke 





In this article, I examined the diverse and complex everyday articulation of the idea of mengist. 
My intention was to bring to the fore the broad range of ways through which the state comes 
to be constituted by people who are positioned differently. I have argued that the state in 
Ethiopia is culturally constructed as an effect of different discursive practices. The discourse 
of corruption is one of the ways in which local people construct an idea of a good state that lies 
beyond the venality of local politics. Their sublime ideas of statehood, imagined through its 
perceived impartiality, is juxtaposed against the failure of equitable distribution of 
development resources, attributed to the corrupt practices of local officials. 
My ethnography also reveals the complex process by which hierarchical conception of 
authority and normative values that contain relational principles intersect. While popular 
conception of state-society relations entails an asymmetry of status, it does not necessarily 
prescribe an imbalance of power. Each party depended on the other, economically and 
politically. Given the reciprocal nature of paternalism, popular imaginings moralise the state 
by engendering a set of concomitant expectations. Thus the Ethiopian state ought to be 
nurturing, paternal and benevolent. In this sense, normative religious values form the backbone 
of political responsibility that they tie state actors into relations of fundamental, divinely 
oriented relations obligation, requiring them to deliver what people need and want. This is why 
common characterizations of Ethiopian culture as authoritarian miss the point. I would argue 
that, in studying the state in Ethiopia, it is essential to dispense with rigid definitions of the 
concept of mengist and investigations that focus on the absence or presence of distinctions 
(such as mengist vs party, mengist vs government) and to instead focus on the social and 
political processes in which meaning is embedded.  
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The points of reference of my informants’ understandings of the state is multiple and 
divergent. If discursive practices in Africa today are a complex mixture of the cultural, the 
normative and the ideological (such as development), then we can no longer easily capture the 
state in a framework of a single theme. The complex conjectures of the livelihood activities 
pursued by local people, and the ways that these are guided by, re/articulated and imbibed in 
the context of shifts in the economy, technologies of rule and development projects such as 
agricultural and cooperative schemes, industrial strategies and programmes of poverty 
reduction shape the working of the state and the way people interact with them on a daily basis.  
In studying state-society relations in Africa, we may then need to rethink and move beyond the 
materialist perspective and employ symbolic-cultural approach and within this approach we 
may need to ask whether the story we tell is consistent with the evidence about the meanings 
the local actors themselves attribute to their actions. 
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Notes 
1 Kebele is the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia and typically has a population of between 
5,000 and 10,000 people. 
2 The concept of discourse as developed by Foucault is more than just language. Discourses, 
Foucault (1972: 49) maintains, are ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak’. In this article, I use the concept of discourse to draw attention to the contingent mode 
of action and set of social practices that arise from situated agents, their experience and their 
beliefs and which are expressed in language. 
3 The ideology of developmental state is part of the Ethiopian state’s identity and instrument 
of legitimation (de Waal 2015).Thus, development is a central theme in which narratives about 
the state are produced and contested. My purpose here is not to examine or offer a definitive 
account of developmental state, but to tease out aspects of the current obsession with 
development (and its entanglement with corruption and cultural idioms) as a lens to understand 
the production of state ideas. For discussions of developmental state in Ethiopia, see de Waal 
2015, Lefort 2015 and, Vaughan 2015. 
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4 The kebele domain is highly gendered sphere, reflecting the traditional patriarchal division of 
spheres in which women are associated with the private/household and men are associated with 
the public. A result women's views are not well represented in this article. 
5 The fact that I am was a male native speaker of Amharic, the official language of Ethiopia, 
which is also the language of the local community, combined with my knowledge of local 
customs granted me access to such male environments. 
6 In Ethiopia, cooperative unions import agricultural inputs, mainly fertilisers, pesticides and 
different kinds of seeds, through a government agency called Agricultural Inputs Supplies 
Enterprise (AISE) and distribute them to smallholder farmers via local primary cooperatives 
that are explicitly controlled by kebele politicians (Spielman 2008). 
7  Woreda (roughly meaning district) is the most central local administration unit in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy in Ethiopia. Each woreda is composed of several kebeles (roughly 
meaning neighbourhood). 
8 Conversation, the first interlocutor, November 2014. 
9 Conversation, the second interlocutor, November 2014. 
10 Interview, woreda administrator, woreda town, November 2014.  
11 Interview, woreda Agriculture Bureau head, woreda town, November 2014. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Interview, model farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
14The Degga Water Users Association (WUA) is a cooperative entity established to represent 
the interests of the farmers’/water users in management of local irrigation unit in the Koga 
irrigation system.  
15 Interview, Degga WUA head-cum-party chairman, Degga, November 2014.  
16 Interview, woreda administrator, woreda town, November 2014. 
17 Interview, kebele chairman, Degga, November 2014. 
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18 Interview, DA, Degga, November 2014. 
19 Conversation, middle-aged farmer, Degga, October 2014.  
20 Conversation, middle-aged farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
21 Conversations with two middle-aged farmers, Degga, November 2014. 
22 Interview, elderly farmer, Degga, October 2014. 
23 Conversations with my acquaintance Ayele, Degga, November 2014. 
24 Interview, elderly farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
25 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
26 Interview, elderly farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
27 Interview, elderly farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
28 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
29 Interview, middle-aged farmer, Degga, November 2014. 
 
 
